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The authors test the hypothesis that product standards 
harmonized to de facto international standards are 
less trade restrictive than ones that are not. To do this, 
the authors construct a new database of European 
Union (EU) product standards. The authors identify 
standards that are aligned with ISO standards (as a 
proxy for de facto international norms). The authors 
use a sample-selection gravity model to examine the 
impact of EU standards on African textiles and clothing 
exports, a sector of particular development interest. 
The authors find robust evidence that non-harmonized 
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standards reduce African exports of these products. EU 
standards which are harmonized to ISO standards are 
less trade restricting. Our results suggest that efforts 
to promote African exports of manufactures may need 
to be complemented by measures to reduce the cost 
impacts of product standards, including international 
harmonization. In addition, efforts to harmonize national 
standards with international norms, including through 
the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement, promise concrete benefits through trade 
expansion.Help or Hindrance? 
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1  Introduction 
In a world of continued cuts in tariff rates of protection, the trade effects of non-tariff 
measures—including product standards—assume greater importance in research and 
policymaking. This is particularly true for African exporting countries, many of which now 
enjoy, at least in principle, substantially duty-free access to major developed country markets, in 
particular the European Union (EU). 
Many product standards are not protectionist in intent. They may not be developed in regard to 
trade at all. Instead, they may respond to legitimate concerns of consumers or producers relating 
to, for example, product quality or fitness for purpose. There is evidence, moreover, that certain 
standards increase and expand trade opportunities in certain sectors (Moenius, 2004). However, 
product standards can also impact the marginal and/or fixed costs of foreign exporters, and can 
thereby advantage domestic industries.  
There is reason to believe that this problem is particularly relevant to developing country 
exporters, in particular in Africa. On the one hand, developing countries have largely not been 
involved in talks on Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and other agreements designed to 
mitigate compliance costs (Baldwin, 2000). In the absence of such measures, compliance costs 
can be substantial.  
Table 1 provides summary data on the investment costs required to comply with product 
standards, as a percentage of firm sales, taken from the World Bank’s Technical Barriers to   - 2 -
Trade Database.
1 In Sub-Saharan Africa—the region that is of primary interest for this paper—
the average is 7.65% of sales, but the range reported by firms runs from 0.01% to 124%. In Latin 
America, by contrast, the average is only about one-third as high (2.56%) and the range is much 
narrower (0.01% to 13.36%). A similar pattern is apparent in the last row of Table 1, which 
summarizes the data for textiles and clothing producers in all sample regions. The average cost is 
2.73% of sales, but the range is once again very wide: 0.01% to 44.1%. It seems reasonable to 
expect that part of this variation is due to differences in firm size and productivity—with the 
largest impacts being felt by the smallest and least productive.
2 Foreign product standards are 
therefore likely to be a particular constraint on small and medium-sized businesses, which makes 
this issue a vital one for developing countries seeking to stimulate that part of the economy via 
increased contact with world markets. 
Even in the presence of significant compliance costs for exporters, however, the trade policy 
question in this area cannot simply be one of “rolling back” product standards, as if they were 
protectionist tariffs or quotas. Rather, the emphasis should be on limiting—where present—the 
negative spillovers that legitimate product standards can have for exporters in other countries. 
This is the difficult line that the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade traces. One 
way the Agreement attempts to do so is by encouraging the use of de facto international 
standards: Article 2.5, for example, creates a rebuttable presumption that technical regulations 
aligned with international standards do not constitute “unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade”. The idea is relatively simple: complying with one “international” standard—and there can 
                                                 
1 This firm-level survey database is described in detail by Wilson and Otsuki (2004), and is publicly available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/st-db/Criteria.asp. For an econometric analysis using these data, see Maskus et al. 
(2005) and Chen et al. (2006). 
2 Jaffee and Henson (2005) show through detailed case studies that management capacity and strategic choices also 
play an important role.   - 3 -
be any number of de facto “international” standards—should be less costly for all concerned than 
complying with multiple national or regional standards, and help promote a relatively level 
playing field for exporters. 
This paper presents the first empirical evidence to indicate the potential benefit in the approach 
taken by the WTO Agreement on TBTs. We show that EU product standards harmonized with 
international standards restrict African textiles and clothing exports far less than do European 
Union standards not aligned with international norms. Thus, international harmonization of 
product standards could be seen as an important complementary policy in support of recent 
efforts to extend more generous and easily accessible preferences to the developing world (see 
e.g., Collier and Venables, 2007). As Brenton and Hoppe (2007) argue, expanding African 
exports of manufactured goods in traditional development sectors, such as clothing, is much 
more than just a question of preferential rates of duty. 
Our results are consistent with a framework in which standards impact trade through at least two 
channels. Compliance with standards increases the marginal costs of exporting and thereby can 
reduce export flows (the intensive margin of trade). At the same time, exporters must also pay a 
fixed cost to adapt products to suit foreign standards. This can reduce the probability that a 
country will export at all (the extensive margin). Our results provide support for the proposition 
that it is possible to reduce the fixed and marginal costs associated with product standards by 
using de facto international standards as the basis for harmonization. 
Our results build on and extend the existing literature in three ways.
3 First, we use the Perinorm 
database (Swann et al., 1999; Moenius, 2000, 2004, 2006) and the online catalogue of the 
                                                 
3 For a general review of the empirical literature, see WTO (2005). On the theoretical side, see, for example, Fischer 
and Serra (2000), Casella (2001), Gandal and Shy (2001), and Ganslandt and Markusen (2001).   - 4 -
European Committee for Standardization (CEN) to create an original database of EU product 
standards applied to textiles and clothing. Our data distinguish between standards that are 
equivalent to ISO standards—a proxy for international harmonization—and those that are not. 
This allows us to address a different policy question from the one examined by, for example, 
Moenius (2004, 2006). In these papers, the author focuses on the extent to which bilaterally-
shared standards promote trade. 
Second, we examine the impact of voluntary standards, since they represent an important, but 
under-analyzed, part of the standards landscape in Europe. Our results are therefore 
complementary to existing work dealing exclusively with mandatory standards, such as Brenton 
et al. (2001), Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006), Fontagné et al. (2005), Chen and Mattoo 
(2004), Disdier et al. (2007), and Baller (2007). These studies generally find some evidence that 
product standards impact negatively on trade with “outsiders”—i.e., those countries outside the 
harmonization zone. The effect is not uniform, however, and tends to vary from one sector to 
another (see also Moenius, 2004). 
Third, we examine the trade impacts of product standards both at the extensive and intensive 
margins. Our results therefore complement existing analyses on mandatory standards (Chen and 
Mattoo, 2006; Baller, 2007) and firm-level survey data (Chen et al., 2006). Moreover, in 
specifying an over-identified version of our sample selection gravity model, we also produce 
evidence corroborating recent theoretical work on the importance of credit constraints in trade 
models with fixed costs. Our results can be interpreted as supporting the view that standards 
create fixed product adaptation costs, which need to be financed (e.g., Chaney, 2005; Manova, 
2006).   - 5 -
Against this background, our paper proceeds as follows. The next Section describes the EU’s 
approach to product standardization and harmonization, and its interactions with WTO 
disciplines. We then outline the World Bank EU Standards Database in Section 3, contrast it 
with previous data collection efforts, and present some descriptive results. Section 4 contains our 
gravity model specification and empirical results. We draw some policy conclusions in Section 
5, and sketch a number of possible directions for future research. 
2  Product Standards and Harmonization in the European Union 
It is easy to get lost in the terminology that has grown up around product standards. As such, it is 
important to outline, in brief, the concepts we address here. In this Section, we also outline the 
legal regime governing product standards and harmonization in the EU, as well as its interactions 
with WTO disciplines.
4 
The WTO distinguishes between technical regulations (which are mandatory) and product 
standards (which are voluntary). The principal legal obligations in the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBTs) do not apply to voluntary standards. They only address mandatory 
technical regulations. For instance, only draft technical regulations need be notified to the WTO 
Secretariat under Article 2.9. In addition, Article 2.4 requires that Members generally use 
“international standards”—which are most often voluntary—as the basis for their mandatory 
technical regulations. Moreover, Annex 3 of the Agreement sets out a Code of Good Practice in 
regard to voluntary product standards—which Members need take “reasonable measures” to 
ensure is accepted by national standard setting bodies. In sum, both mandatory technical 
                                                 
4 This discussion draws heavily on EC (2000), Trebilcock and Howse (1999, Chapter 6), and Brenton et al. (2001).   - 6 -
regulations and voluntary product standards can be affected, directly or indirectly, by WTO 
disciplines. 
It is not just in the Agreement on TBTs that the line between mandatory and voluntary standards 
blurs. It is also true of the European standards system. Since the start of the “New Approach” to 
technical harmonization and standardization in 1985, the role of Europe-wide legislation 
(“Directives”) has been to establish “essential requirements” for certain product sectors. These 
requirements are mandatory and must be met by all products in those sectors. 
The European standardization process, however, involves more than EU Directives. While they 
prescribe “essential requirements”, they do not mandate detailed technical specifications that 
products must meet in order to conform to those requirements. Instead, the European Committee 
for Standardization (CEN)—a trans-national association established by national standard-setting 
bodies across Europe—produces harmonized product standards in line with the requirements of 
each Directive. These standards must be reflected in the national standards of all EU Member 
States. Conformity with CEN standards—while voluntary—gives rise to a presumption that a 
product complies with the corresponding “essential requirements”.  
The New Approach, therefore, combines elements of both technical regulations and product 
standards. This regulatory framework in Europe applies only to a limited number of sectors, and 
does not cover textiles and clothing (see Table 2). In sectors without a New Approach Directive, 
the responsibility for product standards devolves to standard setting bodies across Europe. Those 
bodies include both pan-European ones (like CEN) and national standards bodies (such as 
AFNOR in France, BSI in the UK, and DIN in Germany). CEN issues European standards after a 
consensus-based process, concluded by a vote of adoption. National standard setting bodies are 
required to implement CEN standards in their respective countries, and to ensure that any   - 7 -
conflicting national standards are withdrawn. CEN had issued 12,357 standards and approved 
documents by the end of 2006, with another 3,510 in preparation (see 
http://www.cen.eu/cenorm/aboutus/information/statistics/index.asp, accessed on 2 February 
2007). By contrast, the European Commission has issued to date less than two dozen New 
Approach Directives (see Table 2). 
What are the key points that emerge from the complexities of standards at the WTO and in the 
EU? For present purposes, there are at least two. First, it is not just technical regulations that 
potentially matter for trade. As we have shown, both technical regulations and product standards 
play a simultaneous and sometimes symbiotic role in the EU standardization context. Thus, both 
are relevant to African manufacturers interested in exporting to the EU. Both are also connected, 
though in very different ways, with the WTO Agreement on TBTs. 
Second, standardization in Europe is not limited to New Approach sectors. CEN’s own work—
independently of EU Directives—leads to EU standards in other areas. And as the figures in the 
previous paragraph suggest, CEN has been most active in performing this role. It is therefore 
important to have an idea of the economic impact of CEN’s standards, in particular from a 
development point of view. 
3  The World Bank EU Standards Database 
The empirical literature referred to in Section 1 makes clear the difficulty of assembling reliable 
and consistent data on product standards. (See WTO, 2005, for a review of the various data 
sources that are available.) In order to investigate the impact of EU standards on African textiles 
and clothing exports, we have collected original data on the extent of European standardization   - 8 -
in that sector over the period 1995-2003.
5 In this Section, we briefly discuss our methodology, 
compare it with alternative approaches, and present some basic descriptive results from the 
World Bank EU Standards Database (EUSDB). 
As discussed above, there are no New Approach Directives covering the textiles and clothing 
sector. It is therefore not possible to use dummy variables for the application of Directives, as 
was done in previous work such as Brenton et al. (2001), Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren 
(2006), Chen and Mattoo (2004), and Baller (2007). 
One alternative would be to use TBT notification data from the WTO, as in Fontagné et al. 
(2005) and Disdier et al. (2007).
6 However, we do not favor that approach for two reasons. First, 
WTO rules only require Members to notify technical regulations, not product standards (Article 
2.9 of the Agreement on TBTs). Given the importance of voluntary product standards in Europe, 
it seems unduly restrictive to focus only on mandatory measures. Second, it is far from clear that 
individual Members interpret Article 2.9 in the same way, thereby raising concerns of data 
consistency. For instance, Belgium has lodged 207 TBT notifications since 1995, whereas 
Ireland has apparently not submitted any.
7 It seems unlikely that such a large discrepancy can be 
fully explained by substantive differences in standardization practices between the two countries. 
As a result, we are not convinced that WTO notifications data always provide an accurate picture 
of the standards environment in all Members. 
                                                 
5 The World Bank EUSDB will be made freely available through the website 
http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/trade_costs.  
6 The non-tariff measures section of UNCTAD’s TRAINS database only has EU data for the year 1999. 
7 See the online search feature available through http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm, accessed on 
31 January 2007.   - 9 -
In assembling the World Bank EU Standards Database), we follow the approach of Swann et al. 
(1996) and Moenius (2000, 2004, 2006). We rely primarily on Perinorm (www.perinorm.com), 
an extremely rich bibliographic database maintained by the British, French, and German 
standard-setting bodies. It contains over 1.1 million records from 22 (mostly OECD) countries. 
Each record corresponds to a single national, regional, or international standard. It provides a 
short verbal description, from which it is usually possible to identify the product or sector to 
which the standard applies. Perinorm also indicates when links exist to equivalent standards in 
other jurisdictions, including at the regional (CEN) and international (ISO) levels. It is therefore 
possible to identify with precision both the stock of EU standards, and the subset of them that 
translate ISO norms into local practice. We refer to this second category of European standards 
as being “harmonized with ISO standards” or “internationally harmonized”.
8 
It is important to highlight that Perinorm is not primarily intended as a tool for research. On the 
one hand, this is a strength: Perinorm is designed to facilitate industry access to—and purchase 
of—product standards, which suggests that there is a commercial incentive to ensure 
completeness.
9 This end-user focus makes Perinorm somewhat unwieldy for doing applied 
international trade work. In particular, Perinorm classifies standards according to the 
International Classification for Standards (ICS), for which there is no concordance to the product 
                                                 
8 We are using equivalency with ISO standards as a proxy for harmonization with de facto international standards. 
Due to lack of data, our analysis excludes private standards, or norms issued by other bodies, which might also 
fulfill a similar role. However, we are confident that we are capturing an important part of international 
standardization activity in this area, since ISO has issued over 300 standards affecting the textiles and clothing 
industry. These standards focus on test methods and specifications that help promote product consistency and 
conformity to expectations (ISO, 2004). ISO’s work in this area involves 25 participating countries and 52 observers 
(http://www.iso.org/iso/en/stdsdevelopment/tc/tclist/TechnicalCommitteeDetailPage.TechnicalCommitteeDetail?CO
MMID=1479, consulted on 26 February 2007). 
9 It can be argued that the incentive structure in place for TBT notifications works in the opposite direction, since 
Members do not want to “invite” WTO disputes by providing information on changes in their technical regulations.   - 10 -
classifications commonly used in trade analysis. For textiles and clothing, the ICS is relatively 
imprecise in its classifications: heading 61.020 “clothes” is distinguished from 61.040 
“headgear” and 61.060 “footwear”, but it is not possible to drill down to any lower level of 
disaggregation. We therefore have to rely both on the ICS classification and on verbal 
descriptions to manually map standards to Harmonized System products. 
The data collection process for the World Bank database works as follows. First, Perinorm is 
searched for EU standards (coded as “EN”), and basic information is extracted manually from 
individual records. We limit attention to those documents identified as “standards” by Perinorm, 
and exclude all other document types included in the database. (Moenius, 2000, identifies 39 
partially overlapping document types in Perinorm.) Data captured for each standard include the 
dates of entry into force and withdrawal, and a 1-0 dummy variable indicating harmonization 
with an ISO standard. That variable is coded according to whether or not Perinorm includes an 
ISO standard in its list of linked standards within each record, along with a code indicating that it 
is “equivalent” or “identical”. In the second stage, each standard is mapped to one or more HS 4-
digit products using the short, verbal description provided by Perinorm, as well as its ICS code. 
Next, we cross-check all of the above information against CEN’s online standards catalogue 
(http://www.cen.eu/catweb/cwsen.htm). Then finally, we produce simple counts of the number 
of standards affecting each HS 2- and 4-digit product category over the period 1995-2003. A 
standard is considered to be in force for a given year if it came into force before or during that 
year. If it is withdrawn at some point during the year, it is still assumed to be in force for the 
entire year. Amendments to existing standards are counted as additional standards. 
It is useful to provide a simple example of the above process. Standard number EN 20105 
provides a series of tests for determining the color fastness to washing of textiles. It is typical of   - 11 -
the type of standards the World Bank database captures, since they mostly relate to testing and 
product specifications. CEN introduced EN 20105 in 1992, and amended some parts of it in 
1994. It is therefore considered to be in force at all times during the database sample period 
(1995-2003). Since EN 20105 implements ISO standard 105, it is coded as being harmonized 
with ISO standards. The standard applies to all textiles, and is therefore mapped to all HS 2- and 
4-digit codes that cover that product category, namely Chapters 50-63. As this example makes 
clear, individual standards often have very wide product coverage.
10 It is for this reason that in 
what follows, we aggregate the data so as to distinguish amongst three “sub-sectors” rather than 
14 HS Chapters. Those sub-sectors are clothing (HS 61-63), fabrics (HS 56-60), and fibers (HS 
50-55). 
Tables 3-7 and Figures 1-5 contain some basic descriptive results from World Bank database. A 
number of trends are apparent over the sample period (1995-2003). First, EU standards are 
distributed unevenly across sub-sectors (Table 3 and Figure 1). Clothing accounts for only a 
modest fraction of the overall number of harmonized standards, a little over 10%. The main 
standardization activity has been in relation to fibers and fabrics, each of which account for 
around 45% of the total number of harmonized standards. This division is reasonably constant 
throughout the sample period. 
Meanwhile, Table 4 and Figure 2 show that aggregating across sub-sectors, the share of 
internationally harmonized EU standards increased between 1995 and 1999, before falling for 
the remainder of the period. The overall movement involved is not large, however: the extreme 
shares are 45% and 56%. A more stark contrast appears when we compare the experiences of the 
                                                 
10 The correspondence table in Moenius (2000) between ICS and SITC categories discloses the same dynamic.   - 12 -
three sub-sectors. The share of harmonized standards for both clothes and fabrics increases 
markedly over the sample period, from an admittedly low baseline in both cases (Tables 5-6 and 
Figures 3-4). However, the opposite dynamic is apparent for fibers: the share of harmonized 
standards rises slightly between 1995 and 1998, but then falls markedly for the remainder of the 
period (Table 6 and Figure 5). The contrast between the three sub-sectors at the end of the 
sample period is also interesting: for fibers, over 80% of standards are harmonized with ISO 
standards, while the figure is just 20% for clothes and a little under 30% for fabrics.  
It is important to stress that at this stage, the World Bank data covers Community-level standards 
only. Since the standard setting body in each EU Member State is required to translate such 
norms into local standards, our data therefore also capture part of the standardization activity of 
each individual country. However, we do not currently have data on country-specific standards 
in EU Member States. There are two main reasons for this. First, data availability in Perinorm 
varies considerably from country to country. Without any simple cross-check, such as the CEN 
online catalog, it is difficult to be sure that a dataset of national standards is in fact capturing all 
relevant information. Second, standardization at the country level has been ongoing for a much 
longer time span that at the regional level. As a result, it is necessary to go much further back in 
history in order to make a reliable assessment of the total stock of standards in force at any given 
time. Not unexpectedly, Perinorm’s coverage becomes more patchy the further back one goes 
(Moenius, 2000), thus rendering it particularly difficult to obtain accurate stock information for 
those countries with a long history of standardization.   - 13 -
4  Model and Estimation Results 
In this Section, we provide some basic intuition for the empirical question we are examining in 
this paper. We then present our empirical model and estimation results. We keep the theoretical 
presentation highly stylized in order to make the basic mechanisms as clear as possible. 
Starting from a benchmark of free and standard-less trade, the introduction of foreign product 
standards imposes two sorts of costs on exporters. On the one hand, there is a fixed cost of 
product adaptation to meet the foreign standard. In addition, there is the marginal cost of 
demonstrating conformity, in addition to any higher per unit production costs the standard itself 
may imply. Tables 8-10 present some firm-level evidence on the extent of these effects, taken 
from the World Bank’s Technical Barriers to Trade Database. Design costs and 
testing/certification costs play a significant role in firm decisions whether or not to export, and 
how much. Technical regulations are an important factor in expanding exports for most surveyed 
firms. 
For simplicity, we assume that the costs of compliance are uniform across countries.
11 
Intuitively, there are two main channels through which standards can affect trade flows.
12 On the 
one hand, higher variable costs mean that exporting firms tend to export less due to the presence 
of increased trade frictions. But in addition, higher fixed costs make it harder for producers to 
export at all, since the hurdle they must jump in order to gain access to a foreign market is 
                                                 
11 Relaxing this assumption could be a promising avenue for future research. Intuitively, differential compliance 
costs would provide an additional mechanism whereby the effects on standards “insiders” would differ from those 
on “outsiders”—including developing countries.  
12 For simplicity, we leave to one side the kinds of information benefits posited by Swann et al. (1996), and Moenius 
(2004, 2006). Due to data constraints in the empirical part of the paper, we also exclude the possibility of cumulative 
effects, whereby standards relating to intermediate inputs indirectly impact the fixed and variable production costs 
of final products.   - 14 -
higher. In other words, standards can plausibly be linked both to effects on export volume and 
the propensity to export (Chen et al., 2006; Baller, 2007; Chen and Mattoo, 2006). 
Next, we consider introduction of an internationally harmonized standard in one potential export 
market.
13 This means that the same standard applies in that market as in a composite “rest of the 
world” region. By comparison with a standard-less benchmark, this scenario will still tend to 
reduce trade through the two mechanisms discussed in the previous paragraph. That effect will 
generally be weaker than if each harmonizing country implemented its own distinct standard: 
instead of paying one fixed and variable market access cost for the whole region, an exporter 
would have to pay multiple costs. 
Consolidating the foregoing, we expect that standards will generally exhibit a negative impact on 
trade, but that such effects will be mitigated when these standards are aligned with de facto 
international standards. Given the data we have available, our working hypothesis is therefore 
the following: EU standards that are harmonized with international standards (proxied here by 
ISO standards) exert a less negative impact on African export volumes and propensity than those 
standards which are not.
14  
4.1  Empirical Model 
To examine this hypothesis, we use a standard gravity model of international trade applied to 
data on EU-15 imports of textiles and clothing from Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 11 for 
                                                 
13 We assume that the fixed and variable costs of compliance do not vary too much across standards. We are 
therefore in the “horizontal” standards paradigm, in which differing norms reflect culturally influenced preferences 
and traditions rather than objective restrictiveness (Baldwin, 2000). 
14 Since the policy question that motivates our research relates to the differential effect of harmonized versus non-
harmonized standards, it is not strictly necessary for us to make any particular hypothesis as to the sign of the 
individual coefficients. It should still be possible to test our hypothesis even in the presence of the type of positive 
information effects found by Moenius (2004).   - 15 -
variable definitions and sources, and Table 12 for countries included in the sample). Our sample 
period is 1995-2003. As previously noted, individual EU standards in this area often tend to cut 
across numerous HS product lines, which makes it desirable to aggregate the trade data to a 
higher level of generality. We therefore retain the distinction between clothes (HS 61-63), fabrics 
(HS 56-60), and fibers (HS 50-55) that was used above, and we aggregate all data to those 
categories. 
We take the micro-founded gravity model formulation of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003, 
2004) as our starting point: 
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dependence of exports from i to j on trade costs across all importers. 
We modify the bilateral trade costs component of the standard model so as to explicitly include 
our standards counts, differentiating between the number of EU standards that are harmonized   - 16 -
with ISO standards (stds_iso) and the number that are not (stds_non). The trade cost function 
also includes, as is usual in this literature, the distance between pairs of trading countries (dist), 
and dummy variables to take account of important geographical and cultural links such as a 
common border (contig), colonial links (colony) and a common official language 
(comlang_off).
15 We therefore specify: 






ijt off comlang colony dist non stds iso stds t _ log ) _ log( ) _ log( log 3 2 1 2 1 β β β γ γ + + + + = (2) 
As Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003, 2004) suggest, estimation of their model can be 
simplified by replacing the “multilateral resistance” terms with appropriate fixed effects. In this 
case, a strict interpretation of their structural model requires fixed effects in the importer-sector-
time, exporter-sector-time, and sector-time dimensions (compare Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006, on 
this point). In principle, it would also be necessary for the trade costs coefficients to vary across 
sectors due to differences in the intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution. However, this approach 
necessitates estimation of a large number of parameters. In order to obtain useful results, it 
requires substantial variation at a very fine level in the independent variables. For our baseline 
model (3), we therefore prefer a simpler formulation using fixed effects only in the exporter (θj), 
importer (δi), product (ψk), and year (τt) dimensions. These fixed effects control for country-
specific, time-invariant factors, along with time-varying factors that affect all exporting 
countries. This last category includes reform of the EU quota system—for which we do not have 
direct data—during implementation of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. It also 
                                                 
15 There are two reasons why we do not include applied tariffs in the trade costs function. First, most African 
countries have had access over the sample period to very low or zero duty access to the European market in this 
sector. Second, the most significant set of trade policy measures affecting textiles and clothing over this period was 
the ATC quota system, not tariffs.   - 17 -
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The above formulation captures the impact of trade costs on bilateral trade volumes. In terms of 
our working hypothesis, therefore, we expect  0 1 2 < <γ γ . However, the impact that we are 
capturing is conditional on trade taking place between the two countries, i.e. on  0 >
k
ijt imports . 
Zero or missing trade flows are excluded from the effective sample in (3), which has been shown 
to bias the resulting coefficient estimates (e.g., Helpman et al., 2007). Moreover, (3) on its own 
does not allow us to say anything about the second part of our working hypothesis, which has to 
do with export propensity. 
To address these two problems together, we use a Heckman (1979) sample selection model.
16 It 
postulates two equations, namely an outcome equation which takes the form of (3), and a 
selection equation. The selection equation determines the probability that a given observation is 
included in the effective sample for the outcome equation. The two equations are linked by a 
correlation ρ, which compensates for the sample selection bias that would otherwise pertain. For 
the time being, we assume that the same explanatory variables appear in both equations. The 
model is therefore just-identified, and parameter estimates can be obtained by maximum 
likelihood estimation of the two equations jointly. (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004, argue that it 
is desirable for the model to be over-identified, and we return to this point below.)  
                                                 
16 For other examples in the standards context, see Baller (2007) and Chen and Mattoo (2004). Heckman (1979) 
models have also been used in the wider gravity model literature: e.g., Helpman et al. (2007), Francois and Manchin 
(2007), and Brenton and Hoppe (2007).   - 18 -
Before moving to our empirical results, it is important to address the question of possible 
endogeneity of our standards count variables stds_iso, and stds_non. The number of standards in 
a particular sector could, in a general sense, be endogenous to imports through a political 
economy process. However, none of the African countries we are dealing with here has a large 
European market share. It is therefore unlikely that sector-wide standards—which apply to both 
domestic production and imports from all sources—are set in response to unexpectedly large 
imports from a single African country in a single year. Although we do not expect major 
endogeneity problems in this case, we ensure the robustness of our results by using alternately 
current and lagged standards counts (one, two, and five years).  
4.2  Baseline Results 
We now move on to our results (Table 13). OLS estimates (Column 1) have coefficients with the 
expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. Amongst the standard gravity variables, distance is 
negative and statistically significant, while a colonial relationship (statistically significant) and 
common official language (statistically insignificant) are both positive. We find that both of our 
standards counts lstds_iso and lstds_non are negative. However, only the coefficient on 
lstds_non is statistically significant. It is also of far greater magnitude than the coefficient on 
lstds_iso—the two differ by a factor of around five—which suggests that in terms of both 
economic and statistical significance, it is primarily non-harmonized EU standards which exert a 
negative impact on African textiles and clothing exports. While there is evidence of a negative 
effect also for harmonized standards, it is much weaker. A formal hypothesis test of equality 
between the two coefficients confirms this view (rejection at the 5% level). 
Columns 2-3 of Table 13 present results for the baseline Heckman (1979) model, in which the 
selection and outcome equations both have the same set of explanatory variables (i.e., the model   - 19 -
is just-identified). Coefficient estimates in the outcome equation are broadly comparable with the 
OLS case, but there are some important differences in terms of economic and statistical 
significance. The distance elasticity increases (in absolute value terms) from -1.5 to -2.5, and is 
significant at the 1% level. Both the colonial link and common official language dummies are 
now significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, and the coefficient for the latter is 
considerably larger. We take these changes as evidence that, in the present context, the presence 
of zero trade flows in our dataset can lead to noticeable bias if OLS estimates are not corrected. 
This is supported by the relatively high estimated correlation between the error terms in the 
selection and outcome equations (Rho=0.66).  
In terms of our variables of primary interest, namely lstds_iso and lstds_non, we find that 
Heckman estimation makes a significant change to the latter only: its coefficient is now larger in 
absolute value than under OLS, -0.8 versus -0.5. The coefficient on internationally harmonized 
EU standards remains negative but statistically insignificant, and is now smaller in absolute 
value than the coefficient on non-harmonized standards by a factor of nearly ten. Again, a formal 
hypothesis test confirms the significance of the difference between the two coefficients at the 1% 
level. 
In addition to correcting some apparent bias in the OLS estimates, the Heckman results also 
contain some useful information in their own right. We interpret the estimated coefficients of the 
selection equation as summarizing the impact of different variables not directly on trade flows, 
but on the propensity to export. Following Helpman et al. (2007), we can go further and relate 
the selection equation to fixed cost effects, and the outcome equation to marginal cost effects. 
With this interpretation in mind, we can see that the results in column 3 of Table 13 are 
consistent with sensible analytical priors as to coefficient sign: distance is negative and   - 20 -
statistically significant, while colonial links and a common official language are both positive 
and statistically significant.  
Interestingly, we find that non-harmonized European standards exert a negative and statistically 
significant influence on export propensity. However, standards that are aligned with ISO 
standards carry a statistically insignificant and (slightly) positive coefficient. These standards 
impact export propensity only very weakly, but to the extent that we can measure such an 
impact, it would appear that these types of EU standards actually increase export propensity (cf. 
Moenius, 2004). 
The combined results from the selection and outcome equations therefore suggest that EU 
standards not harmonized to international norms tend to impose significant added costs on 
exporters, both fixed and variable. In both the selection and outcome equations, the difference in 
impact between ISO and non-ISO standards is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
4.3  Robustness Checks 
The above discussion is subject to a well-known caveat: the estimated coefficients from a just-
identified Heckman model like the one presented in Columns 2-3 of Table 13 tend to exhibit 
considerable instability (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). It is preferable to specify an over-
identified form of the same model, which can be achieved by including at least one variable in 
the selection equation that does not appear in the outcome equation. However, the existing 
literature has highlighted the difficulty of finding such a variable in practice. On empirical 
grounds, Baller (2007) uses WTO membership. Helpman et al. (2007) use (alternately) common 
religion, and a measure of the cost of starting a business taken from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report. The disadvantage of using data from Doing Business is that they are only   - 21 -
available for the years 2003-2006. Given that our sample runs between 1995 and 2003, it is not 
feasible in our case to take the same approach as Helpman et al. (2007). 
We therefore propose an alternative. In developing countries, and particularly in Africa, firms’ 
ability to cover the fixed costs of complying with foreign standards is influenced by the level of 
financial development in the exporting country. If credit is expensive and/or hard to come by, 
then it will be more difficult for firms to pay the fixed costs of exporting. We therefore expect a 
measure of exporter financial development to be directly correlated with export propensity.
17 
Even though such a measure could conceivably be correlated with export-conditional trade flows 
as well—since firms might need credit to support ongoing costs in addition to the fixed costs of 
startup—we expect that the connection will be much weaker, thereby justifying inclusion of 
financial development in the selection equation but not in the outcome equation.
18 (For recent 
theoretical work in this vein, see Chaney, 2005, and Manova, 2006.)  
Results from this approach are presented in Columns 4-5 of Table 13. As expected, financial 
development—as measured by domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP—is 
positively and significantly (5%) associated with export propensity.
19 We interpret this as 
indicating that credit constraints can exert a significant impact on African textiles and clothing 
exporters. All other estimated coefficients have the same signs and very similar magnitudes to 
                                                 
17 We leave it to future research to examine the possible role of foreign direct investment in loosening the credit 
constraint postulated here. 
18 We check this assumption empirically by conducting an additional regression (not reported) that includes financial 
development in both the selection and outcome equations. We find, as expected, that the coefficient is positive and 
5% significant in the former, but positive and insignificant at the 10% level in the latter. In all other respects, results 
are very similar to those reported in Columns 4-5 of Table 13. (Cf. Manova, 2006, who finds evidence that financial 
development is significant in both the selection and outcome equations.) 
19 Note that domestic credit as a percentage of GDP enters the equation in levels, not logarithms. Hence, the 
estimated coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity.   - 22 -
those obtained using the just-identified Heckman model discussed above. That our results are 
consistent in this way suggests that our conclusions are robust to the parameter instability that is 
often a feature of just-identified Heckman models. 
As noted above, another potential difficulty with our results is the possible endogeneity of our 
standards measures. To deal with this issue, we re-run the model in columns 4-5 of Table 13 
using one, two, and five period lags of lstds_iso and lstds_non. Table 14 presents our results. 
Qualitatively, they are identical to those from our baseline model: non-ISO standards exert a 
negative impact on trade values and export propensity, although the latter relationship is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level in one of the three formulations. The estimated 
coefficients on harmonized standards, on the other hand, are uniformly positive. With two lags, 
the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level in the selection equation, while with five lags 
it is 5% significant in the outcome equation. In all cases except one—the selection equation for 
the model using five lags—the difference between the estimated coefficients on harmonized and 
non-harmonized standards is statistically significant at the 1% level. If anything, accounting for 
endogeneity by using lags tends to strengthen our initial results. 
As a final robustness check, we re-estimate the baseline model using the Poisson estimator 
advocated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Those authors show that Poisson produces 
consistent estimates in the presence of zero trade values. Moreover, the estimator is known to be 
consistent under relatively weak assumptions (i.e., the data need not follow a Poisson process at 
all), and it does not suffer from the incidental parameters problem which generally gives rise to 
inconsistency and bias concerns in nonlinear fixed effects models (including the Heckman   - 23 -
model).
20 It therefore represents a flexible and increasingly common alternative to the Heckman 
estimator in a gravity context, even though it comes at the price of losing direct information on 
export propensity. 
Poisson results are presented in column 6 of Table 13. With the exception of the colony dummy, 
all estimated coefficients have the expected signs and economically sensible magnitudes. (The 
colony coefficient, though negative, is not statistically significant at the 10% level.) The distance 
and language effects are noticeably stronger in the Poisson estimates than in other formulations. 
Most importantly, we find that non-harmonized standards have an estimated coefficient which is 
negative and 1% significant, while the coefficient on harmonized standards is slightly positive 
but statistically insignificant. Once again, a formal test rejects the null hypothesis of equality 
between the two coefficients at the 1% level. We can be confident, therefore, that our results are 
robust to the use of this common alternative estimator. 
5  Conclusion 
We have shown that there is empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that EU standards 
harmonized with international norms (proxied here by ISO standards) exert a less negative 
impact on African export volumes and propensity than standards which are not harmonized. 
While previous empirical work has supported the existence of an insider-outsider dynamic in 
terms of the trade effects of standardization, this paper is, to our knowledge, the first to consider 
explicitly the impact of international harmonization. 
                                                 
20 On these points, see Greene (2004) and Wooldridge (1997).   - 24 -
The policy implications of these results are of significant interest. On the one hand, our analysis 
suggests that it is indeed appropriate for the WTO Agreement on TBTs to champion the use of 
international standards whenever possible. If Members follow this path, they can help limit the 
negative effects of standardization and harmonization on outsiders—and in particular, on 
developing countries. However, our evidence—combined with existing results due to Swann et 
al. (1996) and Moenius (2004, 2006)—suggests that it is not just mandatory technical regulations 
that can have significant trade impacts, but voluntary product standards as well. As previously 
noted, the WTO’s treatment of these two groups of norms is asymmetric: technical regulations 
are subject to relatively stringent requirements that are directly enforceable through WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings, whereas the position for product standards is considerably more 
blurred. There may well be a case to be made in the future for redressing this imbalance. 
In regard to future research work in this area, we view three areas of particular interest. First, it 
will be important to test the applicability of our findings to other sectors, in particular those that 
are of export interest to developing countries. Second—and flowing from the previous point—
there is likely to be a high payoff from investing in improved data in this area. Research on non-
tariff measures generally, and product standards in particular, suffers from a chronic lack of 
detailed, reliable, and comprehensive data. Clearly a major effort is required to remedy this 
situation, in particular if attention is to be paid both to mandatory technical regulations and 
voluntary product standards. 
Finally, the World Bank EU standards database discloses significant cross-sectoral differences in 
the number and type (harmonized or not) of standards. Future work could usefully investigate the 
determinants of that variation. Just as political economy has proved a useful tool for analyzing   - 25 -
cross-sectoral variation in trade policy measures, so too do we expect it to play an important role 
in elucidating similar variation in standard setting behavior. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Investment costs to comply with technical requirements (% of firm sales). Source: Maskus et al. 
(2005). 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  No. of Obs. 
Sub-Saharan Africa  7.65  23.12  0  124  39 
Eastern  Europe  3.74  8.26  0.03 55.65 38 
Latin  America  2.56  3.28  0.01 13.36 21 
Middle East  6.67  11.59  0.04  44.1  20 
South  Asia  1.79  3.04  0.02 15.75 41 
Textiles and clothing sector (all regions)  2.73  6.8  0.01  44.1  46 
 
Table 2: EU "New Approach" Directives. (Source: http://www.newapproach.org/Directives/DirectiveList.asp, 
accessed 8 February 2007.) 
Directive Sectors  Covered 
90/396/EEC  Appliances burning gaseous fuels 
00/9/EC  Cableway installations designed to carry persons 
89/106/EEC Construction  products 
89/336/EEC Electromagnetic  compatibility 
94/9/EC  Equipment and protective systems in potentially explosive atmospheres 
93/15/EEC  Explosives for civil uses 
95/16/EC Lifts 
73/23/EEC Low  voltage  equipment 
98/37/EC Machinery  safety 
2004/22/EEC Measuring  instruments 
90/385/EEC  Medical devices: Active implantable 
93/42/EEC  Medical devices: General 
98/79/EC  Medical devices: In vitro diagnostic 
92/42/EEC  New hot-water boilers fired with liquid or gaseous fluids (efficiency requirements) 
90/384/EEC  Non-automatic weighing instruments 
94/62/EC  Packaging and packaging waste 
89/686/EEC Personal  protective  equipment 
97/23/EC Pressure  equipment 
99/5/EC  Radio and telecommunications terminal equipment 
94/25/EC Recreational  craft 
87/404/EEC  Simple pressure vessels 
88/378/EEC Toys  safety 
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Table 3: Count by sub-sector of EU standards in textiles and clothing, 1995-2003. (Source: World Bank 
EUSDB.) 
  Clothes Fabrics Fibers 
1995 15  49  53 
1996 18  59  66 
1997 20  73  91 
1998 28  86  101 
1999 32  101  122 
2000 28  119  130 
2001 32  131  137 
2002 35  136  145 
2003 41  149  154 
 
Table 4: Count by type of EU standards in the textiles and clothing sector, 1995-2003. (Source: World Bank 
EUSDB.) 
Year ISO  Standards Non-ISO Standards 
1995 53  64 
1996 70  73 
1997 96  88 
1998 119  96 
1999 145  110 
2000 155  122 
2001 158  142 
2002 168  148 
2003 178  166 
 
Table 5: Count by type of EU standards covering clothing (HS 61-63), 1995-2003. (Source: World Bank 
EUSDB.) 
Year ISO  Standards Non-ISO Standards 
1995 1  14 
1996 1  17 
1997 1  19 
1998 5  23 
1999 6  26 
2000 6  22 
2001 7  25 
2002 8  27 
2003 8  33 
 
Table 6: Count by type of EU standards covering fabrics (HS 56-60), 1995-2003. (Source: World Bank 
EUSDB.) 
Year ISO  Standards Non-ISO Standards 
1995 4  45 
1996 9  50 
1997 11  62 
1998 21  65 
1999 31  70   - 30 -
2000 33  86 
2001 34  97 
2002 37  99 
2003 43  106 




Table 8: Reasons for not exporting, % of surveyed firms, broken down by source. (Source: World Bank 
Technical Barriers to Trade Database.) 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  Eastern Europe  Latin America  Middle East  South Asia 
Design costs  58  90  67  69  65 
Testing/certification costs  59  91  73  64  64 
 
Table 9: Reasons for not exporting, % of surveyed firms, broken down by destination. (Source: World Bank 
Technical Barriers to Trade Database.) 
 
 
Table 10: Important factors in expanding exports, % of surveyed firms, broken down by source. (Source: 
World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Database.) 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  Eastern Europe  Latin America  Middle East  South Asia 
Technical regulations  69  79  75  50  57 
 
Table 11: Data and sources. 
Variable Description  Year  Source 
Colonyij  Dummy variable equal to 1 if country i colonized country j at any 
time, else zero.  NA  Mayer and Zignago 
(2006) 
Distanceij  Great circle distance between the largest cities in countries i and 
j.  NA  Mayer and Zignago 
(2006) 
Domestic 





Imports of country i from country j in sector k for year t. HS 2-
digit data aggregated to three sectors: fibers (50-55), fabrics (56-







Count of ISO-harmonized EU standards in sector k for year t. 





Languageij  Dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j have a common  NA  Mayer and Zignago 
Year ISO  Standards Non-ISO Standards 
1995 48  5 
1996 60  6 
1997 84  7 
1998 93  8 
1999 108  14 
2000 116  14 
2001 117  20 
2002 123  22 
2003 127  27 
  EU Australia Canada Japan USA 
Design costs  70  68  66  68  71 
Testing/certification costs  73  66  66  67  71   - 31 -
official language, else zero.  (2006) 
Non-ISO 
Standardskt 
Count of non-ISO-harmonized EU standards in sector k for year 
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Table 12: Countries included in the dataset. 
Country 
Group  Members 
Importers 
(EU-15) 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 





Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania,, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Table 13: Baseline regression results. 
   Heckman    Heckman   
 
OLS 
  Outcome Selection   Outcome Selection  
Poisson 
ISO  Standards -0.099    -0.098  0.006   -0.069  0.017   0.029 
 [0.107]    [0.109]  [0.049]   [0.109]  [0.050]   [0.046] 
Non-ISO Standards  -0.532**    -0.846***  -0.324***  -0.851*** -0.326***  -0.423*** 
 [0.211]    [0.232]  [0.091]   [0.231]  [0.093]   [0.121] 
Distance -1.543*    -2.504***  -0.990***  -2.441**  -0.950***  -3.992** 
 [0.890]    [0.941]  [0.288]   [0.953]  [0.293]   [1.551] 
Colony  0.689***  0.866***  0.337***   0.874***  0.361***   -0.362 
 [0.246]    [0.241]  [0.097]   [0.245]  [0.102]   [0.260] 
Language  0.15   0.520**  0.427***   0.550**  0.427***   1.911*** 
 [0.209]    [0.227]  [0.086]   [0.229]  [0.088]   [0.335] 
Domestic  Credit            0.004**    
            [0.002]    
Constant 16.902**    16.388**  10.190***  18.079**  10.338***  43.414*** 
  [7.353]    [8.032] [2.665]   [7.962] [2.733]   [14.239] 
Observations  5026   19035 19035   18270 18270   19035 
R-squared  0.49             
H0:  ISO=Non  5.49**   13.23***  19.51***   14.49***  20.21***   12.84*** 
Rho      0.66***     0.65***      
(i)  Dependent variable is log(imports) for OLS and Heckman, and imports for Poisson. All independent 
variables except domestic credit are in logarithms. All models contain fixed effects by exporter, importer, 
sector, and year (estimates omitted for brevity). 
(ii)  Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country pair are in brackets. Statistical significance is 
indicated using * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
(iii)  H0: ISO=Non is a test of the null hypothesis that the two standards coefficients are equal, using the 
appropriate F or chi-squared statistic. Rho is the estimated correlation between the selection and outcome 
equation errors in the Heckman model. 
   - 33 -
Table 14: Regression results using lagged standards measures. 
 Heckman    Heckman    Heckman 
 Outcome  Selection    Outcome  Selection   Outcome  Selection 
ISO  Standards  (t-1)  0.158  0.039          
  [0.121]  [0.052]          
Non-ISO Standards (t-1)  -0.387*  -0.284***             
  [0.224]  [0.097]          
ISO Standards (t-2)        0.089  0.133***       
        [0.114] [0.050]      
Non-ISO Standards (t-2)        -0.707***  -0.136       
        [0.223] [0.098]      
ISO  Standards  (t-5)           0.263**  0.052 
           [0.112]  [0.053] 
Non-ISO  Standards  (t-5)           -4.023***  0.086 
           [1.304]  [0.610] 
Distance -2.334**  -0.929***    -2.515** -0.881***    -3.016***  -0.950*** 
 [0.972]  [0.305]    [0.991]  [0.324]   [1.009] [0.354] 
Colony  0.862***  0.382***   0.842*** 0.410***   0.813*** 0.482*** 
 [0.251]  [0.106]    [0.257]  [0.111]   [0.296] [0.137] 
Language  0.540** 0.415***   0.574**  0.423***   0.660**  0.414*** 
 [0.230]  [0.091]    [0.233]  [0.096]   [0.264] [0.118] 
Domestic Credit    0.007*      0.006      0.008 
    [0.004]     [0.005]     [0.007] 
Constant  15.173* 9.396***   17.524** 5.651**    28.336***  9.470*** 
 [8.526]  [2.868]    [8.628]  [2.813]   [8.993] [3.515] 
Observations  16245  16245   14220 14220   8235  8235 
H0:  ISO=Non  7.17***  15.9***   13.84***  9.51***   10.19***  0 
Rho  0.66***     0.66***     0.68***   
(i)  Dependent variable is log(imports). All independent variables except domestic credit are in logarithms. All 
models contain fixed effects by exporter, importer, sector, and year (estimates omitted for brevity). 
(ii)  Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country pair are in brackets. Statistical significance is 
indicated using * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
(iii)  H0: ISO=Non is a test of the null hypothesis that the two standards coefficients are equal, using the 
appropriate F or chi-squared statistic. Rho is the estimated correlation between the selection and outcome 
equation errors in the Heckman model. 
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